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Abstract. Sensitive digital data, such as health information or govern-
mental archives, are often stored for decades or centuries. The processing
of such data calls for long-term security. Secure channels on the Internet
require robust key establishment methods. Currently used key distribu-
tion protocols are either vulnerable to future attacks based on Shor’s al-
gorithm, or vulnerable in principle due to their reliance on computational
problems. Quantum-based key distribution protocols are information-
theoretically secure and offer long-term security. However, significant
obstacles to their real-world use remain. This paper, which results from
a multidisciplinary project involving computer scientists and physicists,
systematizes knowledge about obstacles to and strategies for the realiza-
tion of long-term secure Internet communication from quantum-based
key distribution. We discuss performance and security particulars, con-
sider the specific challenges arising from multi-user network settings, and
identify key challenges for actual deployment.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography; Confidentiality; Long-term secu-
rity; Quantum key distribution; Information-theoretic security.
1 Introduction
The basis for exchanging a vast amount of information in today’s world is the
Internet — a network that spans the earth and allows any two parties to com-
municate with each other. If sensitive information is about to be transmitted
(e.g., medical records or governmental documents), secure connections must be
established to protect confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity. The most com-
mon method for establishing such a secure connection is to use the Transport
Layer Security (TLS) protocol [21], which combines a key distribution protocol
with a channel protocol. First, the key distribution protocol is run to establish
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a common secret key unknown to a potential eavesdropper tapping the commu-
nication. Then, the obtained key is used in the channel protocol to encrypt and
authenticate the transmitted data, protecting its confidentiality and integrity.
Currently, the most commonly used key distribution protocol is based on
the Diffie–Hellman key exchange [22]. Diffie–Hellman key exchange provides so
called computational security. Its security is based on the assumption that com-
puting discrete logarithms in certain groups is computationally infeasible (i.e., it
would take a prohibitively long time for the computation to finish). However, it
has been shown that quantum computers can efficiently compute such discrete
logarithms [67] and, therefore, Diffie–Hellman key exchange is rendered insecure
once quantum computers are available. Recently, alternative key distribution
protocols based on lattice cryptography have been proposed (e.g., [3,9]) that are
conjectured secure against quantum computers. However, in principle, these pro-
tocols are potentially still vulnerable to computational attacks as their security
is based on a computational problem. Such computationally secure key distribu-
tion protocols achieve security only for a limited period of time, i.e., as long as
attackers do not have sufficient computational power to break the security and
obtain the exchanged secret keys.
An alternative to computational security is information-theoretic security.
Information-theoretically secure components are not vulnerable to computa-
tional attacks (e.g., brute force attacks) and therefore provide long-term security
against them. Channels providing long-term confidentiality require information-
theoretically secure key distribution and encryption. The integrity demands for
such a channel are usually only temporary (computational), that is, it is suffi-
cient to guarantee integrity while the data is in transit. While substantial ef-
fort has been made to define, understand, and construct computationally se-
cure channels (originating, e.g., from [6]), a thorough understanding of how
to construct information-theoretically secure channels achieving standard se-
curity goals of confidentiality and integrity as well as replay and reordering
protection is still lacking. For information-theoretic encryption, one-time pad
(OTP) encryption [66] is an optimal solution. We remark, however, that any
information-theoretically secure encryption scheme requires the secret key to be
of the same length as the encrypted data. There exist several candidates for
information-theoretically secure key distribution. A naive approach is to dis-
tribute keys using a trusted courier that physically delivers a generated key
stored on a hard drive. This approach, however, suffers from obvious disadvan-
tages with regards to practicability because it requires hours of traveling by
the courier, which is far too long for most practical applications. Other ap-
proaches for information-theoretically secure key distribution are protocols in
the bounded storage model [49] or the noisy channel model [77]. However, it is
currently unclear how these models can be realized in practice [12]. Currently, the
most promising approach for information-theoretically secure key distribution is
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). The security of QKD is based on the laws of
quantum physics and its feasibility has already been demonstrated in many field
tests [16,25,55,61]. However, there are still several challenges in order to realize
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QKD-based long-term secure communication on the Internet. The performance
and security of implementations of QKD protocols is still an issue. Furthermore,
techniques need to be developed that allow using QKD-based secure channels in
distributed networks with many users.
In this work, we first discuss the current state of quantum-based key distribu-
tion protocols with regards to performance and security (Sec. 2). We then discuss
the current state of enabling QKD in multi-user networks (Sec. 3). Finally, we
summarize the challenges yet to be addressed in order to realize QKD-based
long-term secure communication on the Internet (Sec. 4).
2 Quantum-based Key Distribution
We now describe the state of the art for QKD. We first explain relevant concepts
of quantum physics, then we categorize and summarize prominent QKD proto-
cols. Next, we compare the performance of the protocols, and finally we discuss
security models and attacks on protocol implementations.
2.1 Quantum Physics Background
QKD protocols rely on fundamental laws of quantum physics: the typical change
of state of a quantum object after a measurement and the impossibility to copy
a quantum state without disturbing the state of the original particle. Security of
QKD protocols relies on the fact that a potential eavesdropper reveals himself
by the process of his attack. Eavesdropping introduces inevitable errors to the
exchanged quantum states that can later be detected by the communicating
parties.
At the core of every QKD protocol lies the exchange of quantum states.
In contrast to modern optical communication systems, where classical bits are
encoded as an absent (0) or present (1) “classical” laser pulse in a certain time
interval, QKD uses qubits — quantum objects, that can carry more than one
bit of classical information at a time and exhibit a behavior that cannot be
described within classical physics. Very different physical systems can serve as
qubits: single photons, weak laser pulses, Fock states and squeezed states of
light, half-spin quantum systems as trapped atoms and ions, or Rydberg atoms
coupled to a cavity [10]. Quantum information can be encoded using different
types of observables, i.e., physically measurable properties of qubits. For example,
information can be encoded using polarization, phase, creation time of single
photons, or quadrature, phase and amplitude of multi-photon coherent laser
states [10,64].
2.2 Common Functionality
We now sketch the functionality that is common to all QKD protocols dis-
cussed later. These protocols comprise a raw key distribution phase and a post-
processing phase.
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Raw key distribution. The first part of every QKD protocol establishes a raw
secret key by transmission of qubits over a special quantum channel. Ideally,
such a channel should not alter the encoded information due to interaction of
qubits with the transport medium (e.g. a change of polarization in a glass fiber).
Distortions must be kept low in order to fulfill the requirements for a successful
key distribution, because disturbances of the qubit states may have also been
caused by an attacker.
During the raw key distribution phase, the communicating partners exchange
qubits over the quantum channel. Upon receiving a qubit, the recipient performs
a measurement on some observable of the qubit and decodes a classical bit from
its result according to a procedure determined by the chosen QKD protocol. Af-
terwards, the communicating partners consult about their measurements using a
classical authenticated channel. This procedure is specific to each QKD protocol
and the result is a raw secret key. If they deduce that an attacker might have
disturbed the quantum information too severely, the key distribution has to be
started over.
Post-processing. After the raw key distribution phase, each of the communicating
partners has obtained an individual raw key. Perfectly correlated keys are very
improbable, so error correction (e.g. low density parity check [26], cascade [11],
or polar codes [37]) has to be performed. Afterwards, privacy amplification is
applied to generate the final key from the error-corrected raw key. This ensures
security even against an eavesdropper that may have observed a small number
of bits undetected during the raw key exchange or the error correction. The
resulting secret key can then be used as a key for OTP or Advanced Encryption
Standard (AES) encryption.
As described above, QKD requires an authenticated classical channel between
the communicating partners. Such an authenticated channel can be established
using a short pre-shared secret or by relying on a typical TLS connection. Re-
cently, it was proposed to realize authenticated channels based on laws of quan-
tum physics [29,54]. We remark that the authenticated channel used in a QKD
protocol needs to remain secure only while the QKD protocol is executed.
2.3 Protocol Families
There are many different ways QKD protocols are implemented. For our analysis,
we categorize them by the way information is prepared (prepare-and-measure
or entanglement based) and by the type of variables (discrete variables (DV),
continuous variables (CV), or distributed phase reference (DPR)).
Classification by information preparation method. We describe cate-
gories for QKD protocols based on how the quantum states are prepared.
Prepare-and-measure. In prepare-and-measure protocols (Fig. 1a) a sender Al-
ice actively prepares an information carrier, encodes information within it and
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sends it to one or more recipients. Prominent representatives of this protocol cat-
egory are the protocol developed by Bennett and Brassard (BB84) [7] or derived
protocols, such as [63,69].
Entanglement-based. Entanglement-based protocols (Fig. 1b) involve a source
producing entangled particles — multiple quantum objects that can be described
by a correlated quantum state violating local realism [5]. A measurement on some
observable of one of the objects instantly affects the state of the other object.
This can be observed by Bell tests [5] — a procedure allowing the verification
of the useful entanglement [65] of the initial particles. The qubits are detected
by the communicating parties, and, because of the non-classical correlations be-
tween these particles, Alice and Bob can share a (quantum) secret without direct
exchange of information. A prominent representative of this protocol category is
the E91 protocol, developed by Ekert [23].
  
Alice Bob
(a)
  
Alice Bob
Source
(b)
Fig. 1. (a) Prepare-and-measure protocol (e.g. BB84 [7]), (b) Entanglement-based pro-
tocol (e.g. E91 [23]). Solid line denotes the quantum channel, dashed line stands for
the authenticated classical channel. Arrows denote the direction of information flow.
Classification by the type of variables. QKD protocols can also be classified
by the type of variables used for the information carriers.
Discrete variables. For the protocols with discrete variables (DV), the values of
the information carrying observables are discrete. Most commonly, qubits are
transmitted using single photons or weak laser pulses. In principal, half-spin
particles (e.g. electrons) can also be used, but the transmission of such particles
is problematic. The information can be encoded, for example, in time, polariza-
tion, spin, or phase. The source can be implemented as a prepare-and-measure
system or as an entanglement-based system. DV protocols require expensive and
inefficient single-photon source and detector devices. Prominent representatives
of this protocol category are [7,8,23,63].
Continuous variables. Continuous variable (CV) protocols are an alternative to
DV protocols that, instead of qubits (e.g. single photons and weak laser pulses),
use many particle states (e.g. squeezed or coherent states of light). Hereby no
discrete variables are detected — zeros and ones — but the observation of the
continuous spectrum of the quadrature components of light is performed, e.g., by
5
homodyning techniques [20]. Detection of quantum states is also performed dif-
ferently in CV protocols compared to DV protocols. Here, standard components
for quantum communication are used. For instance, homodyne or heterodyne
detection schemes [20] (In homodyne schemes, the signal and a local oscillator
have identical frequencies. In heterodyne schemes, these frequencies differ) are
employed. This is much faster and more efficient than the detection of single pho-
tons. Most of these protocols can be implemented both as prepare-and-measure
as well as entanglement-based schemes. Prominent representatives of this proto-
col category are [30,57].
Distributed phase reference. A third family of QKD protocols — distributed
phase reference (DPR) protocols — uses discrete variables for encoding of in-
formation, but at the same time the security is guaranteed by observing the
coherence of subsequent pulses. Bits may be encoded in a sequence of pairs of
pulses [69] or in the phase of subsequent pulses [36]. The two approaches may
also be combined into a two dimensional QKD protocol [4], where several bits
can be encoded by two subsequent pulses. DPR protocols require similar de-
vices as DV protocols, namely, single photon sources and detectors. Prominent
representatives of this protocol category are [4,36,69].
2.4 Existing Protocols
In the following, we briefly summarize the functionality of a few prominent QKD
protocols and assign them to the categories presented above.
BB84. The first QKD protocol was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984
(BB84) [7]. This protocol is a prepare-and-measure protocol, belongs to the DV
protocol family, and uses discrete states of photons for information encoding. The
information can be carried by polarization or by the phase of single photons.
The BB84 protocol with polarization encoding works as follows (see Fig. 2):
Alice chooses randomly one bit — 0 or 1, and one of two polarization bases:
rectilinear, denoted as
⊕
, or ±45◦, denoted as⊗. Then, Alice encodes that bit
within the chosen basis and sends it to Bob. Bob also chooses a basis randomly
and independently from Alice, in which he detects the photon. Statistically, in
half of all cases his choice does not correspond to the basis chosen by Alice. If
Bob chooses a wrong basis, he can measure the correct bit with a probability of
50%, so an error rate of 25% is introduced. To get rid of these errors Alice and
Bob exchange publicly over an authenticated classical channel information about
their chosen bases and dismiss all of the events detected in the wrong bases. This
procedure is called key sifting. Afterwards, parts of the sifted key are exchanged
between Alice and Bob, compared, and their quantum bit error rate (QBER) is
estimated. If the QBER does not exceed 20% [17], a secure connection can be
established using two-way error correction and privacy amplification. For this,
post-processing algorithms are used as described in Sec. 2.2 and a secret key is
distilled.
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Fig. 2. BB84 protocol.
E91. Another milestone in DV QKD protocols is the protocol proposed by Ekert
in 1991 (E91) [23]. It was the first entanglement-based protocol that does not
require the source to be a part of either Alice’s or Bob’s setup. A source of
entangled photons distributes distinct photons of a qubit pair to the different
communicating partners Alice and Bob. Then, Alice and Bob choose a detection
basis randomly and independently, perform measurements, and obtain a raw
key. With a random subset of this raw key, they test for a violation of Bell’s
inequalities. If the test succeeds, Alice and Bob start key sifting, error correction,
and privacy amplification procedures as in BB84. Otherwise, they have to start
the key distribution over again.
GG02. In Fig. 3 the CV protocol implemented by Grosshans and Grangier is
shown [30]. Here, a single-mode coherent state produced by a laser at the wave-
length of 1550 nm is modulated in one of its quadratures p or q by using a
random, Gaussian distributed modulation. Then the signal is transmitted over a
noisy channel to Bob, who measures only one of the quadratures using homodyne
techniques. Therefore, a local oscillator (e.g. laser light) has to be implemented
locally by Bob or transmitted over the quantum channel from Alice. The choice
of the quadrature is performed by the addition of the phase ϕ ∈ {0, pi/2} ran-
domly to the local oscillator. Information reconciliation and error correction are
performed after the detection.
2.5 Performance
The aforementioned QKD protocols can be run over free space or via glass fibers.
Depending on the communication medium, different secret key generation rates
and effective distances are observed. Typical key rates for DV protocols are up
to several kbit s−1 on the distance of several 10 km and up to several bit s−1 over
approximately 100 km distance (cf. Tab. 1) via fiber cables. Recently, DV-based
quantum key distribution via satellite has been demonstrated over a distance
of 1203 km at a key rate of 1 kbit s−1 [43]. For CV protocols the key rate is
comparable — up to 10 kbit s−1 for channels of a few km and up to 150 km ef-
fective distance. In Tab. 1, performance measures for fiber based QKD protocols
are listed. For all QKD protocols, the key rate decreases exponentially with the
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ModulationLaser
φ
Homodyne 
detection
Fig. 3. Schematic of a CV protocol, as in [30] with homodyne detection. AFG is an
Arbitrary Function Generator.
communication distance due to noise and losses in the quantum channel. It has
been proven that the maximal key rate depends solely on these losses [72,56].
Lost information is assumed to be gained by a potential attacker in the case
of prepare-and-measure protocols, resulting in a failed protocol execution. In
the case of entanglement-based protocols, this reduces the violation of the Bell
inequality, ultimately leading to a failed Bell test and protocol execution.
Table 1. Performance of different protocols. PaM: prepare-and-mesure protocols, EB:
entanglement-based protocols.
Protocol Type Source Key rate Max. dist.
at 100 km
Yin [78] (2016) DV EB 2 kbit s−1 404 km
Korzh [41] (2015) DPR PaM 10 kbit s−1 307 km
Wang [75] (2012) DPR PaM 20 kbit s−1 260 km
Stucki [70] (2009) DPR PaM 6 kbit s−1 250 km
Liu [44] (2010) DV PaM 15 bit s−1 (200 km) 200 km
Huang [35] (2016) CV PaM 500 bit s−1 100 km
Honjo [34] (2007) DV EB 0.59 bit s−1 100 km
Jouguet [38] (2013) CV EB 200 bit s−1 (80 km) 80 km
Besides the key rate and distance, the compatibility of the system with the ex-
isting communication infrastructure is important. For example, DV QKD proto-
cols require quite expensive single photon detectors, single- or entangled-photon
sources and precise time measuring devices. Simultaneously, the typical distri-
bution distances and rates for the secret key distribution allow for use only in
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metropolitan network areas. Imperfections in the single-photon sources make
photon number splitting attacks possible (see Sec. 2.6).
CV protocols are a more recent class of protocols that offer higher secret key
rates and lower costs for implementation, because neither single photon sources
nor single photon detectors are required. Standard components for optical com-
munication can be used. A recent experiment showed that CV protocols can
be applied even in a geostationary satellite for standard optical communication
achieving much longer communication distances [31]. However, the security of
CV protocols against side-channel attacks is not as well understood as for DV
protocols [20,42] (cf. Sec. 2.6).
DPR protocols currently achieve the best performance results (Fig. 1). Fur-
thermore, multi-dimensional QKD schemes, such as DPR protocols, allow to
transmit more than one bit of classical information in a single qubit [4].
2.6 Security
A QKD protocol is considered secure if, after the protocol execution, the commu-
nication partners Alice and Bob know a common secret key and an eavesdropper
Eve has not obtained any information about the key. We now summarize work
analyzing the security of QKD protocols and discuss theoretical and practical
attacks on implementations of QKD.
Security models and proofs. When analyzing the security of a QKD protocol
the goal is to show security against a powerful attacker, Eve, that potentially
possesses perfect technology. For example, Eve may be able to extract and store
qubits for an arbitrary duration and perform any quantum operation or mea-
surement on them. However, according to fundamental quantum physical laws,
Eve can neither clone nor measure the state of the system perfectly and resend
a new particle without leaving a trace. In addition, usually the existence of an
authenticated classical channel between the communication partners or a short
pre-shared key is assumed. This is necessary to guarantee data integrity and
authenticity, so that Eve cannot perform an impersonation attack or change the
classical data sent. We stress that the authenticated channel does not need to
provide any confidentiality guarantees.
An attack on a QKD system is called individual if Eve measures each qubit
separately. In a collective attack, Eve still interacts with each qubit separately,
but she may measure all the auxiliary systems used for the interactions jointly.
If Eve is allowed to attack several sent qubits simultaneously, the attack is called
coherent. Renner et al. [58] prove the security of a wide range of QKD protocols
against coherent attacks.
QKD security proofs rely on information theory and do not depend on com-
putational hardness assumptions. This fundamental difference in comparison
to currently used key distribution methods guarantees the long-term security of
QKD. However, idealized assumptions in QKD security proofs lead to incomplete
security models. For realistic security guarantees about actual implementations,
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more assumptions regarding hardware and software are required. Indeed, at-
tacks exploiting imperfect devices and insecure software may be possible, as we
describe below.
Depending on protocol families, proven security guarantees against theoreti-
cal attacks vary. While some DV protocols have been shown to be uncondition-
ally secure [45,68], similar proofs for CV and DPR protocols are still missing. An
overview of security proofs for CV protocols is given by Diamanti, Kogias, Lau-
denbach and others [20,40,42]. A security analysis of DPR protocols is provided
by Moroder et al. [51].
As an example, we discuss the security of BB84 against an intercept-resend
attack, which is a special case of an individual attack. In this attack, Eve chooses
a basis randomly and detects the state of particles. She has a probability of
50% to choose a wrong basis. Afterwards, she prepares a replacement for the
detected qubit and sends it to Bob. In that way, she induces a 25% QBER in
Bob’s key. However, as shown by Shor and Preskill, Alice and Bob know the
key distribution session might have been compromised [68] if the QBER exceeds
11%. Other strategies, for example, detection of not every qubit or detection
using an intermediate basis are disadvantageous for Eve, since she obtains less
information about the secret key. In the case of entanglement-based protocols,
during the measurement of qubits, Eve destroys the nonclassical correlations
between the particles, so a Bell test during the key processing fails. In summary,
security proofs for QKD protocols show that an attacker reveals himself when
trying to eavesdrop on the quantum states sent over the network. This is what
makes QKD so powerful in comparison to classical key distribution.
Attacks on implementations. Even for protocols that have been proven un-
conditionally secure, side-channels and non-perfect setups can lead to weak-
nesses. Every single implementation then requires a special treatment. As for
classical cryptography, the developers of QKD systems search for any kind of
weakness in their implementation. Security proofs have to be adapted and side-
channels must to be analyzed.
For example, the creation of tailored single photons is non-trivial. In most
cases, there is a non-negligible probability for pulses with a photon number
larger than 1. Thus, if there is more than one photon in a weak laser pulse,
Eve can pick some photons with a beam splitter and gain information without
being noticed. This type of attack is called a photon number splitting attack. As
a countermeasure, protocols have been modified: decoy states have been added
to BB84 [47] and new protocols, such as SARG04, have been developed [63].
Hijacking a quantum channel by a trojan horse attack, information about
Alice’s and Bob’s setups can be extracted [28] or even manipulated [48]. For
example, if Eve obtains information about Alice’s choice of bases in real-time,
she can perform a successful intercept-resend attack as she is no longer limited
to guessing the bases randomly.
Another possibility is bright illumination of Bob’s detectors via the quantum
channel. This can allow the attacker to control the measurement results of Bob.
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Lydersen et al. describe how an attacker could successfully obtain the complete
secret key and remain unnoticed [48].
Crucially, all these attacks must be performed physically and during the
actual key distribution. This is a fundamental difference to classical key distri-
bution protocols, whose security might be broken by attacks that were unknown
at the time of the distribution.
Device-independent QKD. Device-Independent QKD is an approach aiming
to dispense with the assumption of trust in the own setup hardware [50]. Hereby,
the security of the whole QKD system should be evaluated by a quantum-
correlation test, i.e., a Bell test, similar to the E91 protocol [74]. Since purely
device-independent protocols are hard to realize, measurement-device-independent
QKD protocols have been developed [46,73,78].
3 Quantum-based Key Distribution in Multi-User
Networks
So far, we have discussed QKD in a setting where two communicating part-
ners are connected directly by a dedicated quantum channel. However, in reality
dedicated communication channels usually do not exist between every two com-
municating partners. Instead, communicating partners are connected via hubs
through which the communication is routed. To realize long-term secure commu-
nication using QKD technology, hubs need to be developed that are compatible
with QKD. In the following, we first describe how the Internet is organized us-
ing hubs and thereby identify requirements for QKD protocols that should be
used in such networks. Then, we discuss two approaches for realizing QKD hubs
which allow for using QKD in a hub-based network.
3.1 Network Characteristics of the Internet
The Internet consists of an extensive number of different types of devices that po-
tentially communicate with each other. These devices may be small (e.g. mobile
phones, wearables) or large (e.g. desktop computers). Communication should be
possible between any two devices and the devices should be able to join and
leave the network dynamically. Distances between the devices may be very long
(e.g. several thousand of kilometers) and many services run on the Internet re-
quire low latency (e.g. less than a second) and high transfer rates (e.g. several
megabits per second). These properties are achieved on the Internet by using a
multi-layer network topology consisting of local area networks, metropolitan area
networks, and wide area networks. The different network layers are connected
via hubs (Fig. 4). Messages exchanged between clients are routed through these
hubs. Secure end-to-end communication is usually achieved by establishing a
TLS connection between any two end points.
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Metropolitan Area Network
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Wide Area Network
Local	Area	Network
Metropolitan	Area	Network
Fig. 4. The various network layers of the Internet that are connected via hubs.
3.2 Trusted Node-based Hubs
Network hubs for QKD can be realized using trusted nodes. In this approach,
key material is not directly exchanged between the communicating partners but
relayed over the trusted nodes. Here, each of the communicating partners, Alice
and Bob, are connected to a trusted node in close distance and the trusted
nodes are also connected (Fig. 5). In order for Alice and Bob to establish a
secure connection, they exchange keys with their trusted nodes, and the trusted
nodes also exchange keys between themselves. Then, an end user key for Alice
and Bob is computed from the key material generated on the communication
path. This method for key distribution in distributed networks only provides
security as long as none of the trusted nodes on the communication path is
compromised [24].
On the positive side, such hubs allow to extend the distance limitations im-
posed by QKD protocols. Assuming there exist sufficiently many trusted nodes
between the communicating parties, keys can be relayed several times and QKD
distance limitations only account for each key relay individually. On the nega-
tive side, we have seen that trusted node-based hubs do not support end-to-end
security because the quantum states are destroyed in each hub.
The feasibility of building a trusted node based QKD network has been shown
in several field tests: DARPA network in 2005 [25], in Austria in 2008 [55], in
Japan in 2011 [61] and China [76]. Currently, a 2000 km long link connecting
Beijing to Jinan, Hefei and Shanghai is being installed [19].
3.3 Quantum Hubs
An alternative approach for building QKD networks is to use quantum hubs [32].
Here, the quantum information carriers are routed from Alice to Bob directly
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Alice
Bob
Charlie
Diana
Trusted
Node 2
Trusted
Node 1
Trusted
Node 3
Fig. 5. Scheme of a QKD network link with trusted nodes. Solid lines are quantum
channels, dashed lines denote classical channels.
without any detection or optical-electrical-optical conversions in between. One
can either use active optical switches [18,15] or wavelength division multiplexing
(WDM) to address different recipients. Recently, several experiments showing
entanglement distribution via WDM in glass fiber at telecommunication wave-
lengths have been reported [27,14].
A novel approach for such all-optical network is an extension of entanglement-
based DV protocols. Such a quantum hub works for entanglement based protocols
(e.g. E91 or BBM92) and is depicted in Fig. 6. The photons are created in the
quantum hub at distinct wavelengths and then distributed to different end users
by using standard wavelength division multiplexing techniques. Such quantum
hubs allow for real end-to-end security.
Charlie Diana
Alice Bob
Fig. 6. Scheme of a star-shaped QKD network. Solid lines are quantum channels,
dashed lines are classical channels.
Quantum hubs have similar distance limitations as the corresponding QKD
protocols. To overcome the distance limitations, quantum repeaters (QR) have
been proposed in 1998 as a device that allows to distribute entangled particles
over arbitrarily long distances [13]. The desired distance is divided into shorter
intervals as in Fig. 7. Within every interval entanglement is shared in a standard
way by creating entangled particles A − A′ and B − B′ and distributing them
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to the interval ends, where photons A′ and B are measured jointly, e.g., by a
Bell measurement, such that the remaining pair of particles A and B′ becomes
entangled. This procedure is known as entanglement swapping. Since the timing
is a crucial factor in this process, the photons have to be stored in a quantum
memory, where the quantum objects can be stored for a long time without
distortion of their states. Various architectures of quantum repeaters have been
suggested and various elementary parts of it have been implemented [2,33,59,60]
and analyzed [1,52]. However, an integrated setup has not yet been finished.
A A' B B'
A B'
Fig. 7. Schematic structure of a quantum repeater.
4 Challenges & Outlook
We summarized the current state of realizing long-term secure communication on
the Internet on the basis of quantum technology. To achieve this goal, practical
quantum-based key distribution protocols that can also be used in a multi-user
network setting are required. We have discussed the functionality, performance,
and security of the most prominent candidates for quantum-based key distribu-
tion protocols. They currently allow for data rates of approximately 20 kbit s−1
over a distance of 100 km. A maximum communication distance of 404 km can be
achieved at a data rate of 10−4 bit s−1. Quantum-based key distribution in multi-
user networks is currently realized using relay nodes, which must be trusted to
not compromise the confidentiality of the transmitted data. Furthermore, we
discuss an approach for realizing quantum hubs that allow for quantum-based
key distribution in multi-user networks without trusted nodes. We also briefly
summarize work on quantum repeaters that would allow to remove the distance
limitations of current QKD technology.
In view of the current state of QKD technology, we identify the following
open challenges for realizing QKD-based long-term secure communication on
the Internet:
– The data rate of QKD protocols needs to be further improved so that com-
parable data rates as in classical communication can be achieved.
– Candidate QKD protocols need to be identified that allow for a secure im-
plementation resistant to known theoretical and practical attacks.
14
– Secure connection protocols (e.g., TLS) need to be re-designed to support
QKD-based information-theoretically secure key distribution. Understand-
ing is furthermore needed in how to combine information-theoretic confi-
dentiality with integrity and message-ordering protection in a channel pro-
tocol, taking into account real-world aspects like message fragmentation or
bi-directional communication.
– The proposed approaches for realizing quantum hubs need to be implemented
and their practicality has to be shown.
– The practicality of quantum repeaters needs to be shown in implementations
and it must be shown how they can be combined with quantum hubs in order
to allow for QKD in a wide area multi-user network like the Internet.
Progress towards a wider deployment of QKD was made this year, in the
shape of initial experiments performing QKD communication or preparing it
with satellites [31,71]. These initiatives suggest the possibility of a satellite-based
free-space network, where satellites are trusted nodes and out of reach for at-
tackers. Alternatively, drones could be used to create such a network [62]. For
the future, it is envisioned that quantum channels are combined to realize the
so called quantum Internet [39]. Such an Internet infrastructure would consti-
tute a significant advancement in quantum information processing allowing for
novel applications, such as quantum secret sharing [53] and distributed quantum
computation, which so far have only been explored theoretically.
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